This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Dean, T. J. Articles by Fryxell, G. E. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Do Corporate PACs Restrict Competition?

An Empirical Examination of Industry PAC Contributions and Entry

University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Maria Vryza

Household International, Inc.

Gerald E. Fryxell

University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Corporate political action committees (PACs) play a prominent role in the political strategies of U.S. organizations, and the ability of firms to influence political outcomes is highly controversial. To the extent that PACs enable groups of firms to pursue corporate agendas at the expense of the social good, they promote socially suboptimal outcomes. This study examines the impact of corporate PACs on entry restriction in manufacturing industries and finds a negative relationship between corporate PAC spending and the entry of new firms. Results suggest that PACs are used to shape industry structure to the economic benefit of incumbents.

Business & Society, Vol. 37, No. 2, 135-156 (1998)
DOI: 10.1177/000765039803700202


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				A. J. Hillman, G. D. Keim, and D. Schuler Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda Journal of Management, December 1, 2004; 30(6): 837 - 857. [Abstract] [PDF]